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Wednesday, July 15, 2015

How will the health care system deal with THIS?

Kathryn Schulz, author of one of my favorite books, "Being Wrong: adventures in the margins of error," is now on staff at The New Yorker. She has just written a frightening article about the likely upshot of the looming Big One that may well utterly overwhelm the PacNW health care system (the entire emergency response infrastructure, actually) and render a good bit of the Pacific Northwest uninhabitable for a long time.

I lived in the Seattle area from 1968 -- 1974. Both of my daughters were born there. Wrote my first song there, circa 1969 out in Maple Valley. I absolutely loved living there, and still have numerous dear friends there. This article shook me up. Excerpts from Kathryn's long read:

The Really Big One
An earthquake will destroy a sizable portion of the coastal Northwest. The question is when.


...Just north of the San Andreas ... lies another fault line. Known as the Cascadia subduction zone, it runs for seven hundred miles off the coast of the Pacific Northwest, beginning near Cape Mendocino, California, continuing along Oregon and Washington, and terminating around Vancouver Island, Canada. The “Cascadia” part of its name comes from the Cascade Range, a chain of volcanic mountains that follow the same course a hundred or so miles inland. The “subduction zone” part refers to a region of the planet where one tectonic plate is sliding underneath (subducting) another. Tectonic plates are those slabs of mantle and crust that, in their epochs-long drift, rearrange the earth’s continents and oceans. Most of the time, their movement is slow, harmless, and all but undetectable. Occasionally, at the borders where they meet, it is not.

...Under pressure from Juan de Fuca, the stuck edge of North America is bulging upward and compressing eastward, at the rate of, respectively, three to four millimetres and thirty to forty millimetres a year. It can do so for quite some time, because, as continent stuff goes, it is young, made of rock that is still relatively elastic. (Rocks, like us, get stiffer as they age.) But it cannot do so indefinitely. There is a backstop—the craton, that ancient unbudgeable mass at the center of the continent—and, sooner or later, North America will rebound like a spring. If, on that occasion, only the southern part of the Cascadia subduction zone gives way ... the magnitude of the resulting quake will be somewhere between 8.0 and 8.6. That’s the big one. If the entire zone gives way at once, an event that seismologists call a full-margin rupture, the magnitude will be somewhere between 8.7 and 9.2. That’s the very big one.

When the next very big earthquake hits, the northwest edge of the continent, from California to Canada and the continental shelf to the Cascades, will drop by as much as six feet and rebound thirty to a hundred feet to the west—losing, within minutes, all the elevation and compression it has gained over centuries. Some of that shift will take place beneath the ocean, displacing a colossal quantity of seawater ... The water will surge upward into a huge hill, then promptly collapse. One side will rush west, toward Japan. The other side will rush east, in a seven-hundred-mile liquid wall that will reach the Northwest coast, on average, fifteen minutes after the earthquake begins. By the time the shaking has ceased and the tsunami has receded, the region will be unrecognizable. Kenneth Murphy, who directs FEMA’s Region X, the division responsible for Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska, says, “Our operating assumption is that everything west of Interstate 5 will be toast.”

In the Pacific Northwest, everything west of Interstate 5 covers some hundred and forty thousand square miles, including Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Eugene, Salem (the capital city of Oregon), Olympia (the capital of Washington), and some seven million people. When the next full-margin rupture happens, that region will suffer the worst natural disaster in the history of North America. Roughly three thousand people died in San Francisco’s 1906 earthquake. Almost two thousand died in Hurricane Katrina. Almost three hundred died in Hurricane Sandy. FEMA projects that nearly thirteen thousand people will die in the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami. Another twenty-seven thousand will be injured, and the agency expects that it will need to provide shelter for a million displaced people, and food and water for another two and a half million. “This is one time that I’m hoping all the science is wrong, and it won’t happen for another thousand years,” Murphy says.

In fact, the science is robust, and one of the chief scientists behind it is Chris Goldfinger. Thanks to work done by him and his colleagues, we now know that the odds of the big Cascadia earthquake happening in the next fifty years are roughly one in three. The odds of the very big one are roughly one in ten. Even those numbers do not fully reflect the danger—or, more to the point, how unprepared the Pacific Northwest is to face it. The truly worrisome figures in this story are these: Thirty years ago, no one knew that the Cascadia subduction zone had ever produced a major earthquake. Forty-five years ago, no one even knew it existed...


...At approximately nine o’ clock at night on January 26, 1700, a magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck the Pacific Northwest, causing sudden land subsidence, drowning coastal forests, and, out in the ocean, lifting up a wave half the length of a continent. It took roughly fifteen minutes for the Eastern half of that wave to strike the Northwest coast. It took ten hours for the other half to cross the ocean. It reached Japan on January 27, 1700: by the local calendar, the eighth day of the twelfth month of the twelfth year of Genroku.

Once scientists had reconstructed the 1700 earthquake, certain previously overlooked accounts also came to seem like clues. In 1964, Chief Louis Nookmis, of the Huu-ay-aht First Nation, in British Columbia, told a story, passed down through seven generations, about the eradication of Vancouver Island’s Pachena Bay people. “I think it was at nighttime that the land shook,” Nookmis recalled. According to another tribal history, “They sank at once, were all drowned; not one survived.” A hundred years earlier, Billy Balch, a leader of the Makah tribe, recounted a similar story. Before his own time, he said, all the water had receded from Washington State’s Neah Bay, then suddenly poured back in, inundating the entire region. Those who survived later found canoes hanging from the trees. In a 2005 study, Ruth Ludwin, then a seismologist at the University of Washington, together with nine colleagues, collected and analyzed Native American reports of earthquakes and saltwater floods. Some of those reports contained enough information to estimate a date range for the events they described. On average, the midpoint of that range was 1701.

It does not speak well of European-Americans that such stories counted as evidence for a proposition only after that proposition had been proved. Still, the reconstruction of the Cascadia earthquake of 1700 is one of those rare natural puzzles whose pieces fit together as tectonic plates do not: perfectly. It is wonderful science. It was wonderful for science. And it was terrible news for the millions of inhabitants of the Pacific Northwest. As Goldfinger put it, “In the late eighties and early nineties, the paradigm shifted to ‘uh-oh.’ ”...


...During subduction-zone earthquakes, torrents of land rush off the continental slope, leaving a permanent deposit on the bottom of the ocean. By counting the number and the size of deposits in each sample, then comparing their extent and consistency along the length of the Cascadia subduction zone, Goldfinger and his colleagues were able to determine how much of the zone has ruptured, how often, and how drastically.

Thanks to that work, we now know that the Pacific Northwest has experienced forty-one subduction-zone earthquakes in the past ten thousand years. If you divide ten thousand by forty-one, you get two hundred and forty-three, which is Cascadia’s recurrence interval: the average amount of time that elapses between earthquakes. That timespan is dangerous both because it is too long—long enough for us to unwittingly build an entire civilization on top of our continent’s worst fault line—and because it is not long enough. Counting from the earthquake of 1700, we are now three hundred and fifteen years into a two-hundred-and-forty-three-year cycle.


t is possible to quibble with that number. Recurrence intervals are averages, and averages are tricky: ten is the average of nine and eleven, but also of eighteen and two. It is not possible, however, to dispute the scale of the problem. The devastation in Japan in 2011 was the result of a discrepancy between what the best science predicted and what the region was prepared to withstand. The same will hold true in the Pacific Northwest—but here the discrepancy is enormous. “The science part is fun,” Goldfinger says. “And I love doing it. But the gap between what we know and what we should do about it is getting bigger and bigger, and the action really needs to turn to responding. Otherwise, we’re going to be hammered...

The first sign that the Cascadia earthquake has begun will be a compressional wave, radiating outward from the fault line. Compressional waves are fast-moving, high-frequency waves, audible to dogs and certain other animals but experienced by humans only as a sudden jolt. They are not very harmful, but they are potentially very useful, since they travel fast enough to be detected by sensors thirty to ninety seconds ahead of other seismic waves. That is enough time for earthquake early-warning systems, such as those in use throughout Japan, to automatically perform a variety of lifesaving functions: shutting down railways and power plants, opening elevators and firehouse doors, alerting hospitals to halt surgeries, and triggering alarms so that the general public can take cover. The Pacific Northwest has no early-warning system. When the Cascadia earthquake begins, there will be, instead, a cacophony of barking dogs and a long, suspended, what-was-that moment before the surface waves arrive. Surface waves are slower, lower-frequency waves that move the ground both up and down and side to side: the shaking, starting in earnest.

Soon after that shaking begins, the electrical grid will fail, likely everywhere west of the Cascades and possibly well beyond. If it happens at night, the ensuing catastrophe will unfold in darkness. In theory, those who are at home when it hits should be safest; it is easy and relatively inexpensive to seismically safeguard a private dwelling. But, lulled into nonchalance by their seemingly benign environment, most people in the Pacific Northwest have not done so. That nonchalance will shatter instantly. So will everything made of glass. Anything indoors and unsecured will lurch across the floor or come crashing down: bookshelves, lamps, computers, cannisters of flour in the pantry. Refrigerators will walk out of kitchens, unplugging themselves and toppling over. Water heaters will fall and smash interior gas lines. Houses that are not bolted to their foundations will slide off—or, rather, they will stay put, obeying inertia, while the foundations, together with the rest of the Northwest, jolt westward. Unmoored on the undulating ground, the homes will begin to collapse.

Across the region, other, larger structures will also start to fail. Until 1974, the state of Oregon had no seismic code, and few places in the Pacific Northwest had one appropriate to a magnitude-9.0 earthquake until 1994. The vast majority of buildings in the region were constructed before then. Ian Madin, who directs the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI), estimates that seventy-five per cent of all structures in the state are not designed to withstand a major Cascadia quake. FEMA calculates that, across the region, something on the order of a million buildings—more than three thousand of them schools—will collapse or be compromised in the earthquake. So will half of all highway bridges, fifteen of the seventeen bridges spanning Portland’s two rivers, and two-thirds of railways and airports; also, one-third of all fire stations, half of all police stations, and two-thirds of all hospitals...


...The shaking from the Cascadia quake will set off landslides throughout the region—up to thirty thousand of them in Seattle alone, the city’s emergency-management office estimates. It will also induce a process called liquefaction, whereby seemingly solid ground starts behaving like a liquid, to the detriment of anything on top of it. Fifteen per cent of Seattle is built on liquefiable land, including seventeen day-care centers and the homes of some thirty-four thousand five hundred people. So is Oregon’s critical energy-infrastructure hub, a six-mile stretch of Portland through which flows ninety per cent of the state’s liquid fuel and which houses everything from electrical substations to natural-gas terminals. Together, the sloshing, sliding, and shaking will trigger fires, flooding, pipe failures, dam breaches, and hazardous-material spills. Any one of these second-order disasters could swamp the original earthquake in terms of cost, damage, or casualties—and one of them definitely will. Four to six minutes after the dogs start barking, the shaking will subside. For another few minutes, the region, upended, will continue to fall apart on its own. Then the wave will arrive, and the real destruction will begin.

Among natural disasters, tsunamis may be the closest to being completely unsurvivable. The only likely way to outlive one is not to be there when it happens: to steer clear of the vulnerable area in the first place, or get yourself to high ground as fast as possible. For the seventy-one thousand people who live in Cascadia’s inundation zone, that will mean evacuating in the narrow window after one disaster ends and before another begins. They will be notified to do so only by the earthquake itself—“a vibrate-alert system,” Kevin Cupples, the city planner for the town of Seaside, Oregon, jokes—and they are urged to leave on foot, since the earthquake will render roads impassable. Depending on location, they will have between ten and thirty minutes to get out. That time line does not allow for finding a flashlight, tending to an earthquake injury, hesitating amid the ruins of a home, searching for loved ones, or being a Good Samaritan. “When that tsunami is coming, you run,” Jay Wilson, the chair of the Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC), says. “You protect yourself, you don’t turn around, you don’t go back to save anybody. You run for your life.”


The time to save people from a tsunami is before it happens, but the region has not yet taken serious steps toward doing so. Hotels and businesses are not required to post evacuation routes or to provide employees with evacuation training. In Oregon, it has been illegal since 1995 to build hospitals, schools, firehouses, and police stations in the inundation zone, but those which are already in it can stay, and any other new construction is permissible: energy facilities, hotels, retirement homes. In those cases, builders are required only to consult with DOGAMI about evacuation plans. “So you come in and sit down,” Ian Madin says. “And I say, ‘That’s a stupid idea.’ And you say, ‘Thanks. Now we’ve consulted.’ ”

These lax safety policies guarantee that many people inside the inundation zone will not get out. Twenty-two per cent of Oregon’s coastal population is sixty-five or older. Twenty-nine per cent of the state’s population is disabled, and that figure rises in many coastal counties. “We can’t save them,” Kevin Cupples says. “I’m not going to sugarcoat it and say, ‘Oh, yeah, we’ll go around and check on the elderly.’ No. We won’t.” Nor will anyone save the tourists. Washington State Park properties within the inundation zone see an average of seventeen thousand and twenty-nine guests a day. Madin estimates that up to a hundred and fifty thousand people visit Oregon’s beaches on summer weekends. “Most of them won’t have a clue as to how to evacuate,” he says. “And the beaches are the hardest place to evacuate from.”

Those who cannot get out of the inundation zone under their own power will quickly be overtaken by a greater one. A grown man is knocked over by ankle-deep water moving at 6.7 miles an hour. The tsunami will be moving more than twice that fast when it arrives. Its height will vary with the contours of the coast, from twenty feet to more than a hundred feet. It will not look like a Hokusai-style wave, rising up from the surface of the sea and breaking from above. It will look like the whole ocean, elevated, overtaking land. Nor will it be made only of water—not once it reaches the shore. It will be a five-story deluge of pickup trucks and doorframes and cinder blocks and fishing boats and utility poles and everything else that once constituted the coastal towns of the Pacific Northwest...


...The inundation zone will be scoured of structures from California to Canada. The earthquake will have wrought its worst havoc west of the Cascades but caused damage as far away as Sacramento, California—as distant from the worst-hit areas as Fort Wayne, Indiana, is from New York. FEMA expects to coördinate search-and-rescue operations across a hundred thousand square miles and in the waters off four hundred and fifty-three miles of coastline. As for casualties: the figures I cited earlier—twenty-seven thousand injured, almost thirteen thousand dead—are based on the agency’s official planning scenario, which has the earthquake striking at 9:41 A.M. on February 6th. If, instead, it strikes in the summer, when the beaches are full, those numbers could be off by a horrifying margin...

...OSSPAC estimates that in the I-5 corridor it will take between one and three months after the earthquake to restore electricity, a month to a year to restore drinking water and sewer service, six months to a year to restore major highways, and eighteen months to restore health-care facilities. On the coast, those numbers go up. Whoever chooses or has no choice but to stay there will spend three to six months without electricity, one to three years without drinking water and sewage systems, and three or more years without hospitals. Those estimates do not apply to the tsunami-inundation zone, which will remain all but uninhabitable for years...
Wow. Read the entire piece. How can you even plan for something like this?


Here in the Bay Area, while we wrestle with how to deal with our extreme drought, we too fret over the next California Big One. It may pale in comparison with that which inexorably awaits the PacNW.


My wife is Corporate Director of QA/QC for Gilbane Federal. As I was telling her about the Schulz article and this post, she reminded me of the substantial military infrastructure up in the PacNW. Her company does a ton of construction, repair, and maintenance work for the U.S. military world-wide, including the U.S. northwest.

Have to wonder whether they have any contingency response/mitigation planning going on.

Schulz concludes:
All day long, just out of sight, the ocean rises up and collapses, spilling foamy overlapping ovals onto the shore. Eighty miles farther out, ten thousand feet below the surface of the sea, the hand of a geological clock is somewhere in its slow sweep. All across the region, seismologists are looking at their watches, wondering how long we have, and what we will do, before geological time catches up to our own.
___

ADDITIONAL READING

PDF link here.

UPDATE

See also
The Five Scariest Takeaways From the New Yorker Article About the Earthquake That Will "Devastate" Seattle
by Kathleen Richards • Jul 14, 2015

Could a Catastrophic Earthquake Really Destroy Seattle?
Worried Pacific Northwesterners seek reassurance from geologists, who are the worst people to ask for reassurance.
By Eric Holthaus
Nine Questions for Sandi Doughton, Author of Full-Rip 9.0: The Next Big Earthquake in the Pacific Northwest
by Dan Savage • Jul 15, 2015
Again, how can you truly prepare for something of this magnitude? Again, kinda makes our drought problem seem trivial in comparison.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

The Health Care Handbook 2nd edition, a nice survey of our non-system


I'd bought and read the first edition when it was first released. A good read. Highly recommended, notwithstanding that it's necessarily "a mile wide and an inch deep."

Saw it touted on THCB last week, wherein they cited the chapter on MedMal: "The Health Care Handbook: Medical Malpractice."
Summary

Medical malpractice and how to fix it appears to be a mess—a crucially important mess, based on how often it comes up in society. Which raises the question: Is the problem overstated?

Health services researcher Aaron Carroll made the graph shown below to illustrate the costs of medical malpractice in the context of total health spending. While the costs of defensive medicine—$47 billion—are nothing to sneeze at, it’s also clearly not the primary driver of high health costs. Accordingly, Carroll indicates that tort reform will do little to reduce costs.
I responded in the comments by citing David Marx's "Just Culture" book ("Whack-a-Mole") chapter on MedMal reform.
Retiring the Medical Malpractice System

Medical mishaps and healthcare-acquired infections cause an estimated 200,000 deaths every year in the U.S. alone. That’s losing, every year, nearly 67 times the number of people lost in the September 11 terrorist attacks. Roughly 40 times the number of soldiers lost in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first seven years of warfare. Five times the number lost in automobile accidents. Each year. Almost 550 people every day, 1.8 million total since the IOM report was issued in 1999. That’s the cost of medical mishaps and healthcare-acquired infections. Short of disease, it’s the most likely cause of your own untimely death. In terms of national crises that lead to physical harm, it’s at the top of the list, ahead of war, crime, suicide, and automobile accidents combined.

Perhaps you wonder why we’re apparently all so sanguine about 200,000 preventable deaths each year—I know I do. Maybe it’s because they happen one at a time? Losing fifty or 200 airline passengers in a single accident or thirty soldiers in one insurgent attack is so much more dramatic; these events always lead the evening news. But one person inadvertently killed at your local hospital? It rarely does. And so, that one individual’s family is left to find their own way to wholeness. It is the medical malpractice system that offers hope, often on giant highway billboards put up by plaintiff attorneys: Hurt by your doctor? Call us!

What would the medical malpractice system look like here in the U.S. if we adopted the New Zealand approach? Answer: It would simply go away. We would retire it.

So what would this accomplish? Medical malpractice attorneys make two claims: 1) that the current system provides a needed remedy for those who are injured, and 2) that it deters future malpractice. Malpractice attorneys make the claim that injured parties rightly deserve some financial protection against the threat of unanticipated harm. I agree, and so do the New Zealanders. New Zealanders actually make the claim for all injuries, for whatever cause, not just those caused by healthcare misadventures.

Remember the report that said $587 billion is wasted in our U.S. tort system? In the area of medical malpractice, only 2.5 percent of injured patients even use the system. More than 97 percent of patients harmed by a medical mistake either never know their condition was caused by medical mistake, choose their own health insurance to provide the remedy, or they simply go without any meaningful redress. Rather than continuing with a system that is motivated to limit payouts, we could actually replace our current malpractice system with a no-fault system that would provide a remedy for all injuries received through the malpractice of a healthcare provider. As the New Zealanders say, we’ll do it as a matter of national responsibility. And, by the way, the New Zealanders claim that their overhead expenses are only 8 percent as compared to administrative costs as high as 55 percent here in the U.S. And speed, well, four months to benefits in contested claims in New Zealand, whereas we average fifteen to twenty months to settle torts in the U.S. Oh, and one last thing, purely from a perspective of equity. An external review of the New Zealand system identified that only 5 percent of ACC claimants would have been able to prove fault in the American system. Ninety-five percent of claimants would have been without a remedy here in the U.S.

So what about the second claim, the deterrent effect of medical malpractice claims? The effect is simply not there—at least as a substantive tool for reducing what is now estimated at up to 200,000 lives lost per year in the U.S. There is no evidence that our tort liability system substantially changes individual behavioral choices of practitioners—particularly if what they’re being sued for was a human error, by definition both unintentional and inadvertent.

Providers are apt to drift in their behavioral choices to places they believe are safe through personal experience, yet from a system-level perspective, appear risky. Take the CDC standards for hand hygiene, where rates of non-compliance among doctors are always lower than the compliance rate among nurses. It is generally the doctor, not the nurse, who gets sued for medical malpractice. Even with that increased threat of a lawsuit, doctors still lag behind in hand hygiene compliance rates.

In today’s malpractice world, attorneys are forced to wait until there is injury before they reactively move in to punish the surgeon who we knew all along was engaging in risky behavioral choices. It is a totally reactive system, when the real system safety question should be, “How do we help the surgeon before his risky behavioral choices lead to harm?” How do we empower the state regulator and the local health care team to help the surgeon make better, safer choices before harm occurs? Given that we humans often disassociate our behavioral choices from their future unintended consequences, there is little hope that the tort system can help practitioners make substantially safer choices.

Build a Safer Healthcare System

Unfortunately, there is a lot of work to be done in our healthcare regulatory system. As we’ve seen, many healthcare regulators, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and most state Departments of Health, are still playing Whack-a-Mole in their regulatory policies and approach.

We do need to provide a remedy for those injured by medical misadventure. We also need to build a safer healthcare system. Yet, our trust is simply misplaced when we believe that the medical malpractice system will help with a cure for either of these ills. The approach must be different, Whack-a-Mole has run its course; it has outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any.

Tossing the medical malpractice system will in itself not solve the problems we have. First, we’d have to replace it with a no-fault system of insurance, such as New Zealand’s ACC or our own Workers’ Compensation system. That would take care of the remedy for those who have been injured. Next, regulators and healthcare administrators would have to shift their focus from the severity of harm and who caused the injury, to the design of the healthcare system and the control of behavioral choices within the system. Our no harm, no foul system of accountability in healthcare today, turning a blind eye until harm occurs, must end. As a society, we need to shift to a more proactive system where system design and behavioral choices are additional measures of accountability—in healthcare, in automobile accidents, in spilt milk at the dinner table.

In healthcare, administrators and practitioners should be required to obtain basic competencies in safety science—especially around the roles of system design and personal behavioral choices. We must teach practitioners that they can influence the design of the system, and that in their behavioral choices they have some control over the likelihood of the undesired adverse event. Doctors and hospitals should be required to disclose adverse events and critical near misses, both to the patient and to the state. Transparency and accountability go hand-in-hand. What typically occurs in secrecy today, even between regulatory agencies within the same state, must be made visible.

Doctors and other individual providers must be required to participate in a more effective system of quality assurance that would involve near miss reporting, analysis, and corrective action. Many in the general public do not realize that hospitals have no real oversight over physicians; many physicians work as independent contractors and are given “privileges” at individual hospitals. If the physician/hospital relationship goes awry, the hospital’s only recourse is often to rescind the doctor’s privileges—something they are not motivated to do given the doctor’s revenue-generating role. Practitioners cannot be allowed to work in isolation from a more formal system of quality assurance.

Most healthcare providers choose a life of service. They put themselves in harm’s way to take care of others. They expect a lot of themselves as professionals. Yet, they remain fallible human beings, regardless regardless of any oaths to do no harm. They are going to make mistakes and occasionally drift into risky places (see hand hygiene). The future of our nation’s health depends upon our ability to learn from their errors and at-risk behaviors.

Policy makers, regulators, educators, administrators, and professional organizations must work to help change the public’s perceptions about the appropriate accountability of healthcare providers. Accountability rests with practitioners’ choices, not their errors or their unintended outcomes. This paradigm shift creates more accountability rather than less. There are alternatives to Whack-a-Mole—alternatives that have a history of success.

President Barack Obama has said that we need to re-evaluate our systems and toss those that do not work. I heartily agree. Medical malpractice, America’s most sophisticated and expensive form of Whack-a-Mole, should be the first to go—if not merely to do the right thing for the professionals who dedicate their lives to the service of others, then for the millions injured and the 200,000 who are killed each year by a costly, ineffective healthcare system.

Marx, David (2012-06-06). Whack-a-Mole: The Price We Pay For Expecting Perfection (Kindle Locations 1722-1797). By Your Side Studios. Kindle Edition.
__

Askin and Moore et al have again done a worthy job. Kudos. Citing the Foreword:
Two years have passed since the publication of the initial version of The Health Care Handbook, the pioneering creation of two outstanding Washington University medical students, Elisabeth Askin and Nathan Moore. Strongly motivated by the recognition that many students entering the health professions had little knowledge of the organization, financing, and delivery of health care, they wrote a comprehensive, compact, interesting overview that elicited rave reviews from many individual and institutional experts. The Handbook is now in the hands of a large number of students and other interested parties, including health care institutions. A number of medical schools now use the Handbook as a foundation for relevant educational programs. 

The authors were correct; the Handbook satisfies a significant need. They also recognized from the beginning that there must be a second edition. Health care in America is changing significantly, fueled in part by the progressive implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). A second edition would include important topics not included in the initial volume and improvements in quality and emphasis in response to very useful feedback from reviewers and readers. The goal is to continue to make the Handbook as useful as possible. 

Edition Two retains the fundamentals so aptly covered in its predecessor as well as its readable style— replete with appropriate, well-written revisions and new insights that certainly improve its educational value. Updating PPACA presented a special challenge because of the many unforeseen problems associated with the implementation of its major provisions. Given the likelihood of continued downstream uncertainties, the authors have appropriately emphasized the law’s key principles and explanations of policy issues in the news associated with the law’s rollout. There are timely additions such as a new chapter on quality and technology, a discussion of inter-professional education and teamwork among health professionals, and reviews of specific efforts to improve health care value, for example reducing avoidable hospital readmissions. Another point deserves emphasis. Health care has arguably emerged as the major domestic issue facing all Americans, in part because of its strengths, limitations, and changes. Expanding the health care literacy of students and practitioners in the health professions as well as the lay public is crucial to improving our nation’s approach to overall health status. To these ends, Edition Two of The Health Care Handbook is an excellent step forward. 

On a personal note, Elisabeth’s and Nathan’s careers have flourished despite the enormous time and effort this book has required. Elisabeth has become a resident in primary care at UCSF and Nathan is now a second-year resident in internal medicine at Barnes-Jewish Hospital. They have already contributed to the health literacy of our profession and are now full-time caregivers. We do attract outstanding young people to the study of medicine. 

WILLIAM A. PECK, MD,

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY
ALAN A. AND EDITH L. WOLFF DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE 
DEAN EMERITUS,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

Askin MD, Elisabeth; Moore MD, Nathan (2014-11-19). The Health Care Handbook: A Clear and Concise Guide to the United States Health Care System (Kindle Locations 151-175). Washington University in St. Louis. Kindle Edition.
 
The authors:
Introduction

Why We Wrote This Book

When we were first getting interested in health care, a few years before starting medical school, we tried to cobble together an understanding of what health care even was. We found ourselves lost in a sea of confusion, faced with highly specialized publications that were often ideologically bent. Sure, generalized textbooks are out there, but even those seemed to focus on policy without explaining the huge world of research and drug companies that we kept reading about in the news. Besides, let’s face it: Textbooks are boring. Even a motivated student can only read so much from textbooks without being required to. 

In writing this book, we’ve worked hard to rid our knowledge base of huge gaps, vague opinions, and biased perceptions of some issues. But it shouldn’t be so hard, especially not for health professions students, and especially not in a nation where health care is such a huge, important, costly industry. We should make it as easy as possible to understand the U.S. health care system. 

Once we published the book, we tried to get as much feedback as possible— from students, from patients, from providers, from academics, from industry experts. This second edition has incorporated their feedback. 

OUR GOALS 

The goal of this book is to provide a broad base of facts, concepts, and analysis so the reader gets a thorough overview of the American health care system. The goal is to be exhaustive in breadth rather than in depth, to make sure the reader never gets into an argument about health care only to have his or her opponent bring up a completely unfamiliar issue, to provide a baseline level of facts and analysis so that readers may go forth with the ability not only to understand and evaluate what they read but also to form their own opinions. 

At the same time, the goal is to balance accurate, nuanced, up-to-date content with a compact, readable format. Since nuance and brevity don’t usually go hand in hand, at times we have had to make concessions on one side or the other. 

Finally, a goal of this book is to impress a single theme upon the reader: Everything is always more complicated than you think. (If we could have underlined that phrase obsessively in each copy of this book, we would have.) It’s frustrating to know so much yet know so little; to think there’s a solution if only it weren’t thwarted by reality. But understanding these complications is necessary not only for understanding health care but also for developing informed, nuanced, realistic opinions. [ibid, Locations 196-216]
I would have to say, overall, "mission accomplished."

I like the extensive documentation links ("suggested reading").

apropos of some of my postings,
To quote from an amazing 2013 article in JAMA called “The Anatomy of Health Care in the United States”: 
“The breadth and consistency of the U.S. under performance across disease categories suggests that the United States pays a penalty for its extreme fragmentation, financial incentives that favor procedures over comprehensive longitudinal care, and absence of organizational strategy at the individual system level.” [ibid, Kindle Locations 305-308]
See my recent post The U.S. healthcare "system" in one word: "shards"


If you want a "deep dive" into health care delivery fragmentation, you can't do much better than Einer Elhauge. (And, it's now gotten quite personal for me.)

Moreover, a good deep dive into the daily worlds of physicians and nurses is cited in my post "Nurses and doctors in the trenches."


That post will also take you "back down in the Weeds'."

Relatedly, what of this so-called "Art of Medicine?" See my post “The art of medicine consists of amusing the patient while nature cures the disease.”

Speaking of systemic "deep dives," how about 'The American Health Care Paradox" I wrote about and cited in April 2014?

THE HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK ON OBAMACARE

In light of my prior post "ObamaCare in the wake of King v Burwell at SCOTUS," wherein I reviewed Jed Graham's new book "Obamacare is a Great Mess," it's worth noting The Health Care Handbook's policy reform chapter, and its mention of the ACA:
Criticisms of the Affordable Care Act 

We are not endorsing these positions, and there are counterpoints to all of them. This section simply gives a voice to the ACA’s critics, in their own words, so you can see the range of opinion out there. 

It will make health insurance more expensive: “The law forces insurers to charge the same rates to the healthy and the sick. It mandates that insurers cover services that the government deems ‘essential,’ such as drug-addiction therapy, that most people don’t need. It forces young people to pay much more, so as to partially subsidize the elderly. There’s no such thing as a free lunch. All these new rules [will] make health insurance more expensive.”

It will increase government debt: “The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is fiscally dangerous at a moment when the United States is already facing a sea of red ink. It creates a massive new entitlement at a time when the budget is already buckling under the weight of existing entitlements. At a minimum, it will add $ 1 trillion to government spending over the next decade. Assertions that these costs are paid for are based on omitted costs, budgetary gimmicks, shifted premiums from other entitlements, and unsustainable spending cuts and revenue increases.”

It narrows networks too much: “[ T] he rules ObamaCare imposes to create a supposedly superior insurance product are resulting in an objectively inferior medical product. The new mandates and rules raise costs, so insurers must compensate by offering narrow and less costly networks of doctors, hospitals and other providers in their ObamaCare products. Insurers thus restrict care and patient choice of physicians in exchange for discounted reimbursement rates, much as Medicaid does . . . [e] verybody gets ‘free’ preventive checkups with no copays, but not treatment for a complex illness from specialists at an academic medical center.”

It leads to more government regulation and less free-market competition: “Americans want to have choice and control over their health care (including the doctors they want to see) and want those who provide health care services— insurers, hospitals, and other health care providers— to compete to provide them better care at lower prices . . . [ObamaCare] depends on a complex system of government mandates, inter-dependent regulations, and a highly involved, never-ending process of government decision-making that ultimately takes personal health care decisions out of the hands of American citizens.”

It is inefficient: “Obamacare was sold as a response to the alleged emergency presented by 40-odd million Americans’ lacking insurance. That number was hotly disputed at the time, but even if we were to take it at face value, getting the figure down to 30 million at a cost of more than $ 1 trillion is hardly a bargain.”

These are mostly criticisms from the political right. But the ACA doesn’t lack for critics on the left, too...

It doesn’t go far enough: “[ The ACA’s] approach to health care is fundamentally flawed. It is exceedingly complex. It perpetuates and entrenches the inefficient insurance model of payment for health care. It does nothing to address the rapacious pricing of pharmaceuticals. It ignores hospitals’ ‘medical arms race,’ in which they expand facilities and services based not on community need, but on potential for profit. It still burdens doctors and hospitals with multiple payers, abstruse coding and insecurity about payment for delivered services. It is subject to state-by-state sabotage. At its most optimistic projection it leaves at least 25 million people [uninsured].” [ibid, Kindle Locations 4014-4045]
As is the case throughout the book, the authors mostly just present facts and issues without taking sides. On the misnomer "interoperability":
The ability to share data is called interoperability, defined more specifically as “the ability of different information technology systems and software applications to communicate, exchange data, and use the information that has been exchanged.” It is also a major goal of health IT, as a step toward better health outcomes. Interoperability is very important in allowing different systems to work together, increasing efficiency, improving patient transfers, decreasing repeated tests, and, long-term, to creating standards for clinical decision-making nationwide. [ibid, Kindle Locations 2181-2185]
Missing from that is the core IEEE interop definition phrase "without special effort on the part of the user." See my rants on "Interoperababble."

On "CAM." The folks at Science Based Medicine would likely bristle at this gloss-over:
Complementary and Alternative Medicine: More than one-third of Americans regularly use complementary (used with conventional medicine) or alternative (used in place of conventional medicine) therapies, which include herbal or natural products, acupuncture, and homeopathic care. Most complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is provided in an outpatient setting. Although some insurance plans provide reimbursement for CAM services, the majority of spending is out of pocket and totals more than $ 30 billion annually. 27 Upon hearing the rate of use and spending on CAM, it’s not surprising that the federal government has established a National Center for CAM to study the field. [ibid, Kindle Locations 489-494]
On healthcare "organizational culture":
Culture Change 

Quality and technology innovations have the potential to revolutionize the delivery of care and greatly improve patient outcomes. Two prominent innovations we have mentioned are checklists and Electronic Health Records (EHRs); both have great promise but neither has yet demonstrated a conclusive improvement in patient outcomes. That is perhaps because a checklist or an EHR is just one tool within a larger organizational culture that needs to change. 

An analogy would be a person who wants to get fit and healthy and buys a thighmaster. Fifteen minutes a day, he uses the thighmaster, but the rest of the day he continues to eat junk food and sit on the couch. We all know that’s not going to work (much to the authors’ chagrin). Although the thighmaster “works” as expected, without a change in his other behaviors and actions he will not obtain the outcome desired. The same issue applies with quality and technology innovations. As Lucien Leape says about checklists, “the key is recognizing that changing practice is not a technical problem that can be solved by ticking off boxes on a checklist but a social problem of human behavior and interaction.”

Susan DeVore and Keith Figoli wrote that “Health IT implementation represents a sweeping change away from business as usual to an entirely new approach in health care— one that will require process and behavior changes from nearly all health care workers. As such, it’s important to see the effort as an exercise in change management, not an IT initiative.” This is the real challenge of health quality and technology innovations. Keep this in mind when you read about new software tools that are going to totally fix health care— and when you read a few months later that they don’t live up to expectations. [ibid, Kindle Locations 2263-2277]
Indeed. "Talking Stick," anyone?


Again, overall, a very nice book. Good graphical data depictions. A handy, thorough survey reference. The authors are to be commended for taking all of this on while dealing with the rigors of Med School.

CODA

apropos of healthcare organizational "culture," an interesting post by Dike Drummond, MD:
Why Employed Physicians Quit - The BIG 3

In my work with hundreds of over stressed physicians, only about 30% must actually quit or change jobs to recover from physician burnout. The last straw in their decision is often one of these BIG THREE reasons employed physicians quit...


1) Employed Physicians Quit Because of a Toxic Culture

Most physician groups have no conscious culture or code of honor that binds them together to a standard of behavior.

If I ask a doctor to describe the culture of their group I often get blank stares. The question just does not compute.

In the absence of a consciously created group culture (this IS possible, BTW) most groups simply continue the culture of our residency programs. Competition, everyone working as hard as they can on their own personal gerbil wheel, no acknowledgement of humanity, never show signs of weakness, get out of the office as fast as you can, the biggest producer gets their way ... and on and on.

No wonder it is rare to feel your group is a "home" or that your partners "have your back".


If you are fortunate enough to find yourself in a situation where your group's culture is healthy ... you look out for each other and trust is actually a word you use do describe your partners ... savor it and count your blessings.

Most groups have nothing that binds them save a contract, reimbursement formula and a call schedule.

In the absence of a cohesive, supportive culture amongst the physicians, they are usually pushed around by a non-physician administration that focuses only on financial returns and work conditions slowly drift into the toxic range...
Talking Stick, baby. What BobbyG said. All of the cool, progressive tech and process QI in the world can be stymied by toxic culture.

UPCOMING


I will be there. Registration link here.
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More to come...

Monday, July 6, 2015

ObamaCare in the wake of King v Burwell at SCOTUS


From The New Yorker:
Why Obamacare’s Future is Secure
BY JAMES SUROWIECKI


...Chief Justice John Roberts’s successive opinions in defense of the Affordable Care Act—National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in 2012, and then, last week, King v. Burwell—have definitively ended the debate about the legality of Obamacare. And just as the earlier Roberts’s decision paved the way for the New Deal safety net to become permanent and widely accepted, King may well go down in history as the moment when Obamacare’s long-term survival was guaranteed.

In part, that’s because Roberts’s defense of the law was broad rather than narrow. Many observers had assumed that if the A.C.A. was upheld, it would be under the so-called Chevron doctrine, which says that when a statute’s meaning is ambiguous, courts should defer to the administrative agency’s interpretation of it, as long as that interpretation is reasonable. In the case of King, Chevron would have had the Court defer to the I.R.S., which had read a disputed sentence of the law to mean that people in states that had not established insurance exchanges, and who instead signed up on the federal one, were still eligible for subsidies. Instead, Roberts chose a different tack, ruling that when it comes to matters of deep “economic and political significance,” it is the Court’s responsibility to decide what a statute means. And that cleared the path for Roberts’s sensible judgment that, regardless of the careless way the law was drafted, when you looked as the A.C.A. as a whole, it was plain that the intent of Congress was that any citizen of the United States, assuming they met the income criteria, should be eligible for health-insurance subsidies.
"it was plain that the intent of Congress was that any citizen of the United States, assuming they met the income criteria, should be eligible for health-insurance subsidies."
 That's what I've been saying all along. I'd even predicted, albeit with some hesitancy, a 6-3 vote to Uphold.

More Surowiecki:
[The ACA] actually embodies the principles that most Americans think a health-insurance system should have. That may seem hard to believe, given how much flak the law has taken; even today, in most polls a plurality of those surveyed oppose it. But the data also show that Americans overwhelmingly think it’s important to have health insurance. They believe that insurance plans should have “guaranteed access,” meaning that insurance companies should not be able to deny coverage to people because of preëxisting conditions. In a 2013 New York Times poll, for instance, a remarkable eighty-six per cent of those surveyed opposed discrimination against preëxisting conditions. They also believe in community rating, meaning that women and men should pay the same premiums and that insurance companies should not be able to charge higher premiums just because someone has a preëxisting condition. A sizable majority of Americans also think that low- and middle-income people who don’t have health-care coverage through their employer should get subsidies to help them pay for insurance.

Americans still don’t like the individual mandate requiring them, in most circumstances, to get coverage. But if you want the aspects that are popular, you’re most likely going to need some form of a mandate, which gets younger and healthier people into the system—driving down over-all costs by helping pool risks—and prevents them from gaming it by waiting until they’re sick to buy insurance. You also need subsidies, since there’s no point in mandating that people buy insurance if they can’t afford it. The result may seem kludgy and inelegant. But if you want—and, again, most Americans do—a system that has guaranteed access, community rating, and that keeps insurance relatively affordable for the average American, you’re likely going to get something like Obamacare...
...So with every day that passes, repealing Obamacare gets tougher. Indeed, that’s why the plaintiffs in King mounted a lawsuit that was, as Jeffrey Toobin recently put it, so blatantly cynical—they knew that their best chance of scrapping the law was to have the Court do it for them. And that’s why Roberts’s refusal to do this was so momentous. It would not be surprising to learn that John Roberts thinks Obamacare is a terrible idea. But he’s done his best to insure that it’s going to be around for a long time to come.
I'd eventually started to wonder whether SCOTUS agreeing to hear King v Burwell was a Roberts Rope-a-Dope -- i.e., "be careful what you ask for." A 5-4 would have Kept (anti-ACA) Hope Alive. 6-3 is quite another matter.

"Like, enough, already! Take this back to the Hill if you want redress; quit bothering us with this weak stuff..."

In my view, the King decision was entirely consistent with the clear intent of the law. Justice Scalia was left to poignantly splutter incoherently (and rudely) in dissent. His retirement can't come soon enough for me.

OK, NOW WHAT? WE STILL HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO

All of the advances in medical science (and clinical pedagogy), health IT, and progressive delivery process QI we can muster will still be hemmed in by national policy. Will we continue to experience our health care in the "Shards" of my recent characterization? Will the ACA be complicit in that chronic fragmentation?

Below: I came to this book via the online recommendations of some of those whose work I respect. This has gotta get an award for "Ugliest Book Cover of 2015 Thus Far" (I know they're just attempting some allusive red/blue graphical metaphor stuff, but, ugh).


It's a pretty good read, and, at $2.99 Kindle edition price, an excellent value. Some summary excerpts:
Introduction 
For all the great reporting on and analysis of the Affordable Care Act done by journalists and healthcare policy wonks, the complexity of the law’s many moving parts and the high-stakes political battle surrounding it have defeated any efforts to tell a cohesive story. Yet such an accounting – one that navigates the maze of ObamaCare’s positives, negatives and alternatives with a compass unskewed by politics or ideology – is needed to make sense of the mostly unconstructive debate surrounding what may be the most far-reaching piece of legislation in nearly a half century.

While Republicans too often resort to hyperbole in criticizing the law, Democrats meet substantive complaints with a mixture of denial (ObamaCare critics are peddling myths), defensiveness (Republican ideas would cause bigger problems) and resignation (Sure, the law could be better, but the GOP will never let that happen). The American people have pretty clearly had enough of this circular conversation. Polling shows that they don’t hold ObamaCare in very high regard, but they want the law fixed, not scrapped.

This small book aims to change the conversation about ObamaCare in a meaningful way, and that begins by explaining why the American people are right: The law is sorely in need of reform. While there is no doubt that ObamaCare accomplished a world of good in its first year and a half, and there are many, many successes worth celebrating, I will show that its shortcomings are widespread, profound and very likely to grow worse over time.

This is the logical and necessary starting point for two simple reasons: 1) The first step in reaching a consensus that the Affordable Care Act must be reformed is broad recognition that it falls far short of its promise for far too many of those it was supposed to help; and 2) A clear understanding of what is wrong with the law is an essential guidepost in figuring out how it should – and shouldn’t – be fixed.

While the first half of the book is devoted to explaining what’s wrong with ObamaCare, the real purpose – and the focus of the second half – is to map out a path that can better achieve the goals of the Affordable Care Act.

Chapter 1: Swiss Cheese will explain why the Affordable Care Act is a misnomer for people in a wide variety of circumstances:

The Medicaid Gap: Millions of poor people in 21 states earn too little to qualify for exchange subsidies, yet they remain ineligible for Medicaid because their state political leaders have opted to spurn the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of the program to everyone earning up to 138% of the poverty level.

The Bronze-Plan Trap: Rather than paying an individual mandate penalty, many low-income households are opting for bronze plans that may have the appearance of being pretty cheap. Yet those high-deductible plans could have families pay as much as 40% of their annual income to cover health spending before they begin receiving any help from ObamaCare. To call these households underinsured is an understatement.

The Family Glitch:
For families in which one spouse happens to have an offer to buy health insurance through an employer, the rest of the family is ineligible for exchange subsidies, potentially putting coverage financially out of reach for well over a million spouses and children.

The Middle-Class Cliff: A couple in their early 60s with earnings just above the $ 62,920 cut-off for ACA exchange subsidies may have to pay as much as 40% of pre-tax income on premiums and medical bills if they buy the cheapest-available bronze plan.

The “Skinny” Plan Loophole: In order to limit their own liability under ObamaCare, some employers are offering so-called “skinny” plans to modest-wage workers that provide no coverage for surgery or hospitalization. This is the kind of health insurance in name only that ObamaCare was supposed to supplant.

Graham, Jed (2015-06-23). ObamaCare Is A Great Mess: A View of the Affordable Care Act Without Partisan Blinders & How to Fix It (Kindle Locations 27-63), Kindle Edition.


Chapter 1 takeaway
Judging the Affordable Care Act by how many people get coverage or based on its many, many success stories isn’t sufficient. It also needs to be evaluated based on whether it lives up to its promise of ensuring that pretty much every American household is offered the opportunity to access affordable health care. On that score, it falls far short of its goal, and only partly because the Supreme Court made the Medicaid expansion voluntary.

Millions of low-income individuals and families who are eligible for ACA subsidies are finding that the only ACA coverage they consider affordable won’t protect them from financial distress. Many other households from the working class to the middle class are cut off from much-needed help, either because an offer of employer coverage puts exchange subsidies off limits or because their income puts them just on the wrong side of the subsidy cliff. (Kindle Locations 334-343)

Chapter 2 takeaway
All of the evidence points to the conclusion that the ObamaCare employer mandate has had a measureable, though less than dramatic, effect in limiting the work hours of low-wage employees. Yet there are a host of other less-obvious ways in which the mandate also works against the goal of reducing inequality, leading employers to hold back on wage gains and possibly limit hiring, CBO has said.

The ACA, by providing bigger subsidies to those with lower incomes and making affordable health care less dependent on work, provides both the opportunity and incentive for people to choose to work less. Yet at certain points of the income spectrum, ObamaCare goes overboard in punishing work, sometimes leaving a stark choice: Earn less or forgo affordable coverage. A more careful approach is needed to balance the imperative of an effective safety net and the value of work, in part because ACA work disincentives carry a budget cost – an estimated $ 200 billion through 2024. (Kindle Locations 599-607)

Chapter 3 takeaway
While exchange enrollment will continue to ramp up over the next couple of years, design problems with ObamaCare are likely to make lower participation among the young and healthy a chronic condition, leading to premiums that are higher than necessary. Moderate-income young adults are asked to pay 75% more for a bronze plan than is charged to much older adults at the same income level. Yet ObamaCare’s individual mandate penalty is at its weakest for these young adults, amounting to less than one-third of premiums for high-deductible bronze plans, which will encourage them to gamble on staying healthy.

The negative impact on premiums of a relatively older group of enrollees is likely to be exacerbated by the way ObamaCare subsidies divide up the risk pool, sending low-income enrollees with greater health needs to the deep end, bronze purchasers to the shallow end and catastrophic buyers into a separate kiddie pool. Yet, because catastrophic coverage isn’t proving to be an affordable option in much of the country, many moderate-income young invincibles are more likely to stay out of the pool altogether. (Kindle Locations 820-829)

Chapter4 takeaway
The big test of the ACA’s ability to deliver adequate patient access to care and restrain premium increases has just begun. Some $ 8 billion a year in funding to facilitate patient access is disappearing, and temporary government programs are running low on firepower to bolster the bottom lines of insurers who price premiums too low.

The breadth of double-digit premium hikes proposed for 2016 by market-leading insurers has underscored concerns that the exchanges are attracting a population with higher average medical costs than expected. As premiums, both before subsidies and after, increase faster than income – and faster than the individual mandate penalty – the risk is that the robustness of the insured pool will deteriorate over time as the relatively young and healthy gravitate to high-deductible plans or opt to go without coverage. (Kindle Locations 1043-1051)

Chapter 5 takeaway

Although the Affordable Care Act falls short in many respects, it sets the right goal of ensuring affordable access to health insurance that provides a reasonably appropriate level of coverage. While some ideas for fixing or replacing the ACA would help some people – sometimes at the expense of others – none of the approaches target that goal of broad access to affordable coverage, whether one is young or old; healthy or sick; male or female; near-poor, working class or middle class. (Kindle Locations 1278-1282)

Chapter 6 takeaway
Improving upon the ACA’s affordability problems and making government tax subsidies for buying coverage contingent upon remaining insured can make the individual mandate obsolete. A series of reforms proposed in this chapter would cut the price of a bronze plan by up to 48% for moderate-income young adults and make not-quite-so-high-deductible coverage free, or very close to free, for everyone earning up to 200% of the poverty level. (Kindle Locations 1506-1509)

Chapter 7 takeaway
The employer mandate’s heavy burden on low-wage employers and its firewall that keeps low-wage workers from accessing exchange subsidies are inimical to the goals of the Affordable Care Act. A more rational approach to making employers responsible for contributing to workers’ health coverage could eliminate the glaring problems with the mandate, while providing a modest degree of protection for the employer-sponsored insurance market from sudden disruption. Yet, because moderate-income workers would ultimately bear much of the cost of even a reformed employer mandate, getting rid of it would be the best option. (Kindle Locations 1720-1724)
The author's argument is buttressed by a ton of data, though some of the examples bring to mind the admonition "the plural of 'anecdote' is not 'data'." Nonetheless, Mr. Graham does a pretty good job detailing the maddening complexity of the administration of the ACA and its myriad unintended consequences.

Missing from the book is any substantive discussion of the fundamental actuarial misalignment that continues to bedevil U.S. healthcare policy ("community rating" notwithstanding). As I wrote down near the end of my "Shards" post,
One of my ongoing concerns goes to the "shards" of U.S. health care that comprise the central theme of this post. IMO, it's debatable (and likely unknowable) whether the ACA has increased the prevalence of "broken glass" in the delivery system. Health care "insurance" remains only partially "insurance" in the actuarial sense. The bulk remains woefully inefficient 3rd party (parasitical?) intermediated pre-payment. The ACA is largely a huge, hypercomplex "insurance" reform law with a few QI and payment "improvement" initiatives tossed in.

One thing is clear. Without the ACA, someone like me would now be an actuarial leper --  "uninsurable." Going public with my condition absent the constraints of the ACA would have been unthinkable. (It gave me pause, I have to say, to start this post prior to today's SCOTUS announcement.)

Nonetheless, certain fundamental elements of contention remain. We know that medical actuarial utilization risk is a ~60 year proposition (speaking just of adults), highly and curvilinearly correlated with age. Yet we continue to sell health "insurance" in one-year chunks. Someone like me is now regarded by the likes of BCBS/RI as a "medical loss ratio" loser. Any clinical benefits that accrue to me are a loss to them economically during any one policy period. Those who underwrite clinically effective px's/tx's will in many cases see other parties benefit down the line (in econ-speak, "first mover disadvantage").

Again, we've known this stuff for a long time...
I remain skeptical that we're going to see any constructive, sustained bipartisan attempts at "fixing ObamaCare" with the 2016 White House race now ramping up. I would love to be wrong.


SENATE HELP COMMITTEE HEARING UPDATE, JULY 7TH


Senator Bernie Sanders calls for Single Payer. Much of the ensuing discussion (watching live right now) resonates precisely with Jed Graham's book. Lots of griping about continuing insurance unaffordability, health delivery price opacity, ACA hypercomplexity, etc. No prepared statements, hope there will be a published transcript. Acting Chair Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) opened with a mostly rambling reminiscence about his having worked on health care issues with the late Senator Kennedy. He then essentially repeated the story in his closing remarks.

UPDATE: Witness statements (pdf) have been posted, here, here, here, and here. 
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TECH SIDE UPDATES

Just up at Dr. Carter's EHR Science:
Clinical Software Engineering, Part I: Moving from Generic to Specific
by JEROME CARTER on JULY 6, 2015


There is no standard method or process for creating clinical software, and this bothers me – a lot. There is no information model that everyone agrees on, no object names or properties or methods. Even though clinical care is a collection of processes, we have no standards for naming those processes, the steps that comprise them, nor any standard way of demarcating process boundaries. Despite the years and dollars that have been dedicated to creating clinical software, little has been done in the way of saying how clinical software is best designed and built. It is now time to take up that challenge.

When HITECH went into effect in 2009, EHR systems were seen as the ultimate in clinical software and the centerpiece of HIT. Six years later, we realize that care coordination and patient engagement require much more than an electronic chart, that data exchange must occur between a range of computing devices, that data can arise from any number of sources, and that influencing clinical processes requires software support. The range of processes, users, and data that clinical care systems must support is growing, resulting in new requirements that no one imagined 10 years ago...
 And, from Wired:
Medicine Is a Battlefield. Here’s How to Stay in the Know

SCIENCE, IT’S BEEN said, is a full-contact sport. Even when it doesn’t reach the Supreme Court—from whence a crucial decision upholding Obamacare rumbled forth late last week—health care is constantly tangled up with policy.

And that war in medicine is long tenured. The road to basic research is a gauntlet. Translational medicine is in a mosh pit of competing interests. Clinical trials shift end points like a juking boxer. And if you’re following these streams you won’t miss a moment of the action...
Great links in this article.
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More to come...