Among my numerous long-time print & digital periodicals subscriptions is Science Magazine (I'm an AAAS member). Digital editions of Science Magazine are posted a week prior to the print editions.
Always a first-stop for me. In particular, I look at the latest book reviews. A great source of timely, relevant reading. One ongoing (sometimes a bit irritating) reviewer norm is the "Praise-Criticism-Praise Sandwich." (They are hardly unique in that regard.)
Ya tout the authors, then you find fault with them, after which you make-nice finish by again praising the reviewed work.
A cognitive scientist turns the pursuit of explanation on itself
Explanations are among the most celebrated products of science, but rarely are they scientific subjects themselves. Few have done more to change that than cognitive scientist Tania Lombrozo, whose excellent new book, Why We Ask Why, holds a mirror up to explanatory inquiry. Why, she asks, do we explain at all? What makes an explanation satisfying, and are satisfying explanations more accurate? How do explanations support our goals as learners, teachers, and even political actors?
For Lombrozo, explanations are made, not found. One does not scoop an explanation off the ground the way a naturalist finds a beetle but rather constructs an explanation in one’s mind the way a cartographer sketches a map. (In one of the book’s memorable slogans, explanations are “mental acts, not just facts.”) The book draws on diverse conceptual and empirical resources to develop this view. Beyond psychology, insights come from computer science, history of medicine, theology, political science, primatology, and especially philosophy of science, which motivates much of Lombrozo’s own research.
The approach pays off early in an incisive treatment of Ockham’s razor—roughly, the principle that simpler explanations are preferable to complex ones. The preference for simplicity has been a North Star for generations of scientists, but what accounts for its seemingly productive track record?
Titanic figures from Isaac Newton to Richard Feynman held that simplicity is preferable because the world itself is simple. But Lombrozo is not so sure: Although physics sometimes delivers tidy equations, many phenomena, from a company’s success to a friend’s emotional response—to say nothing of protein folding, climate dynamics, or international relations—hardly seem simple. Moreover, research from Lombrozo’s lab shows that even when available evidence points to complexity (e.g., multiple clinical symptoms with distinct causes), people still favor the simpler story (a single cause of them all), often chasing structure that is not there. So is this scientific virtue just a cognitive vice?...
What of the future of explanation research? The all-human explanatory cast is not accidental; the book speculates that we are the only minds driven to explain, leaning on chimpanzee failures in crucial tests. But the roster may soon expand: Lombrozo describes work suggesting that prompting artificial intelligence (AI) systems to generate explanations can bend them toward humanlike performance, although it is admittedly unclear whether prompted behaviors meet the book’s high standard for explanations (“active, goal-directed constructions” that are “products of dynamic minds aiming for understanding”).
AI also looms as a threat to our own explaining. Children who explain their way to a story’s lesson can better apply it to new cases than children who are told the lesson directly, even if they can repeat it back. When we rely on chatbots or AI summaries to skip difficult explanatory work, Lombrozo warns, we risk similar consequences. If explanations were just facts, it would not matter how we got them. Because they are acts, it does.
She's now at Princeton. (Right quickly down 206 from where I grew up in Hillsborough TWP.) So is her husband Tom Griffiths. I've already had one of his books in my stash. Equally compelling.
I now call them
PRINCETON POWER COUPLE
TANIA'S BOOK
I was blessed to get to teach collegiate "critical thinking" and "argument analysis" for 5 years (1999—2004, evening school adjunct faculty; my day gig was that of a credit risk analyst in a bank). Were I chalk-talking today Tania Lombrozo's book would absolutely be an additional required text. I'd have to (and could) do better on "explanation." From my online syllabus:
CHAPTER 7: "Explanation" vs "argument"
In a nutshell: Explanations are used to clarify how or why something is or was, to give reasons describing [2] the physical attributes [2] the function, or [3] the behavior of something. Often, though, "explanation" is a thinly disguised argument for a conclusion that is still at issue. The same verbal and written structures are employed, the same "because this..." "therefore that..." premise-to-conclusion sequences are used. Explanation is only appropriate when then conclusion is agreed upon going in as factual. It gets confusing at times, because explanations are often used within larger arguments.
Just as there are good/bad, strong/weak arguments, so too are there good/bad, strong/weak explanations. Explanations should fully explain, and be testable, non-circular, appropriately precise and comprehensive, reliable, relevant, consistent with well-established knowledge, and so forth. These are covered in detail in your text.
- If I describe to you in precise detail how a missile works, that's explanation.
- If I describe to you in precise detail how a Missile Defense System "works,” that's an argument that we taxpayers should fund its construction. The "explanation" is inappropriate, given that we've yet to even build a system prototype.
The chapter also covers "justification," i.e., an argument posed to justify a position on an issue or act. All of the evaluative techniques apply when assessing justifications.
Many explanations take the form of "analogy." An analogy is an explanation (or argument) where a widely familiar example is posed in order to explain a more obscure object or concept. Lawyers use analogies all the time when pleading their cases, i.e., "this case" is like that/those "former case(s)", so we ought to decide in the same way as way done before.
Dr. Lombrozo is all over it. Below, a few random snips:
TOM GRIFFITHS
Ch. 13: Universal Laws of Cognition
Probability theory has a lot to offer to cognitive science. It is the best candidate we have for a theory of induction—a tool that we can use to explain both why people can learn from small amounts of data and why currently machines need large amounts of data to do the same. It also has the potential to allow us to combine two big ideas: the structured representations of the rules and symbols approach, and the statistical learning abilities of neural networks. Because Bayes’ rule can be applied to any kind of hypothesis—from logical formulas to connection weights—it allows us to explore the consequences of making different assumptions about how the world is represented and about the inductive biases that guide learning.
But before cognitive scientists could explore that potential, we needed to overcome the belief that probability theory was incompatible with human minds. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky had provided compelling examples of ways that people’s reasoning deviated from probability theory in general and from Bayes’ rule in particular. In order for accounts of human cognition based on probability theory to be taken seriously, these deviations would need to be explained.
Doing so would require taking a new approach to using probability theory to understand thought. It turned out that the key was to stop focusing on human minds, and instead ask about principles of intelligence that might apply to any mind, anywhere in the universe.
Psychology’s First Universal Law
In 1687 Isaac Newton published his universal law of gravitation in the Principia Mathematica. The law asserted that the force of gravitation that we experience on Earth also applies to every object in the universe—that any two objects are attracted by a force proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. Using this law, Newton was able to derive the motions of the celestial bodies that could be seen from Earth, providing a simple unifying principle for explaining astronomical observations.
Exactly three hundred years later, Roger Shepard proposed psychology’s first universal law: the universal law of generalization. Like Newton’s law, Shepard’s was supposed to hold anywhere in the universe. By starting with an abstract problem that any intelligent organism must face and then deriving its solution, Shepard identified a principle that should apply not just to humans, and not just to animals, but to minds of all kinds…
Griffiths, Tom. The Laws of Thought: The Quest for a Mathematical Theory of the Mind (pp. 260-261). (Function). Kindle Edition.
Like I said, Princeton Power Couple. I'm sure the breakfast nook, dinner table, and pillow talk in that household is routinely glorious.
Great reading. Highly recommended.
ERRATA
Anyone recall "the 5 Whys?"In the wake of my initial baby-teeth-cutting Shewhart & Deming I was thereafter trained in Lean 6 Sigma—Root Cause Failure Analysis. "Why, why, why, why, why?" Shit happened. Why? 'Splain it, OK?
More to come...